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COMMENT
PREGNANCY DISABILITY BENEFITS UNDER
STATE-ADMINISTERED INSURANCE PROGRAMS
Traditionally, the unequal treatment accorded men and women was
thought to be dictated by their biological and psychological differences. Yet
with the recent erosion of the mythology surrounding woman, it has become
increasingly clear, that, in a society where an individual's strength is com-
monly measured by his or her wealth or influence, it is largely the denial of
equal employment opportunity to woman that perpetuates the status to which
she traditionally has been relegated. The threshold problem in eliminating
sex discrimination in employment has been to assure that jobs are made
available to equally qualified men and women on an equal basis. Yet
many of the women who cross the threshold and procure employment
find that discrimination persists in such conditions of employment as rate of
compensation, opportunity for promotion and job-related benefits. Discrimi-
nation in the conditions of employment, rather than in initial hiring prac-
tices, is far more difficult to detect and -to measure. In view of the extensive
and ever-growing participation of women in the labor force, such discrimi-
nation poses a problem whose resolution warrants considerable adjustments
in judicial attitudes, employer-employee relations and society's perception of
the role of women.
The magnitude of the problem is easily demonstrated. In 1973, nearly
35 million women, or 45% of all women over sixteen and under seventy
years of age, worked to earn 59% of what men earned. Of these 35 million
women, 42% were married and living with ,their husbands and 4.8 million
had children -under six years old. The participation in the labor force of
over two-thirds of these women is primarily -attributable to economic need;
in 1973, 24% were single; 22% were married to men with incomes under
$7,000, including 6% married to men with incomes under $3,000.1
The Supreme Court's response to this major change in the composition of
the labor force has been grudgingly slow and not completely consistent.
2
1. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WOMEN'S Bu-
REAU (1974).
2. For an analysis of the Court's case-by-case response to sex discrimination, see
Comment, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: An Analysis of Constitutional Ap-
proaches to Achieve Equal Rights for Women, 38 ALBANY L. REv. 66 (1973), and
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The implications of a recent Supreme Court decision which dealt with the
constitutional dimensions of an employment disability program which did not
compensate for disabilities arising as a result of normal pregnancy are poten-
tially significant for this issue and warrant detailed examination.
I. Geduldig v. Aiello-INSURANCE FOR DISABLED WORKERS
To augment its Workmen's Compensation and unemployment legislation,
California has established a state-administered disability insurance program
which pays benefits to persons unable to work because of disabilities stem-
ming from a substantial number of "mental or physical illness[es] and men-
tal or physical injur[ies]. ' '3 The purpose of the program, as expressed in
the California Unemployment Insurance Code, is
to compensate in part for the wage loss sustained by individuals
unemployed because of sickness or injury and to reduce to a mini-
mum the suffering caused by unemployment resulting therefrom.
This part shall be construed liberally in aid of its declared purpose
to mitigate the evils and burdens which fall on the unemployed and
disabled worker and his family.
4
In Geduldig v. Aiello,5 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stew-
art, held that California's failure to insure the risk of disability resulting
from normal pregnancy did not consistute an invidious discrimination in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
district court had held that the omission from the program's coverage of dis-
ability incurred by women as a consequence of normal pregnancy consti-
tuted a classification based on sex which had no rational and substantial re-
lationship to a legitimate state purpose, and thus fell within the fourteenth
amendment's proscription.6
Note, Toward Sexual Equality? An Analysis of Frontiero v. Richardson, 59 IOWA L.
REV. 377 (1973); 48 TUL. L. REV. 710 (1974); 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 348 (1974).
3. CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2626 (West 1972).
4. Id. § 2601.
5. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The majority opinion of Justice Stewart was joined in by
Justices White, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Powell, and Chief Justice Burger. Joining in Jus-
tice Brennan's dissent were Justices Douglas and Marshall.
6. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court to hear a direct appeal is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
When the class action was originally filed, those women who suffered disability caused
by, or arising in connection with, any pregnancy were not eligible for benefits; but be-
fore the district court announced its decision, the California Court of Appeals, in Rent-
zer v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. Human Relations Agency, 32 Cal.
3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973), ruled that payments of disability benefits could
be prohibited only where the pregnancy was normal. The change was codified by a de-
letion and amendment to CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2626.2 (West Supp. 1974).




A. The Nature of California's Program
California's disability insurance system is supported solely by employee
contributions: 7 an employee contributes one per cent of his salary, with a
maximum annual contribution of $858 and a minimum contribution of one
per cent of an income of $300. 9 Weekly benefits vary from $25 to $105
depending upon the greatest amount earned by the employee in one of four
quarters of a twelve month base period, 10 and benefits begin on -the eighth
day of disability or the first day of hospitalization, whichever comes first."
"Disability" or "disabled" includes both mental or physical illness and mental
or physical injury. An individual shall be deemed disabled in any day in
which, because of his mental or physical condition, he is unable to perform his
regular or customary work. In no case shall the term "disability" or "disabled"
include any injury or illness caused by or aris.ng in connection with pregnancy
up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter.
CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2626 (West 1972). As modified, section 2626 now
reads:
"Disability" or "disabled" includes both mental or physical illness, mental or
physical injury, and, to the extent specified in Section 2626.2, pregnancy. An
individual shall be deemed disabled in any day in which, because of his physi-
cal or mental condition, he is unable to perform his regular or customary work.
CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2626 (West Supp. 1974). Section 2626.2 states:
Benefits relating to pregnancy shall be paid under this part only in accordance
with the following:
(a) Disability benefits shall be paid upon a doctor's certification that the
clamant is disabled because of an abnormal and involuntary complication of
pregnancy, including but not limited to: puerperal infection, eclampsia, caesar-
ian section delivery, ectopic pregnancy and toxemia.
(b) Disability benefits shall be paid upon a doctor's certification that a
condition possibly arising out of pregnancy would disable the claimant without
regard to the pregnancy, including but not limited to: anemia, diabetes, em-
bolism, heart disease, hypertension, phlebitis, phlebothrombosis, pyelonephritis,
thrombephlebitis, vaginitis, varicose veins, vencus thrombosis.
CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2626.2 (West Supp. 1974).
This liberalization of the California statute caused the Supreme Court to find the
claims of three plaintiffs to be moot, since their disabilities had resulted from abnormal
pregnancies and disability payments had been made to them. The validity of the preg-
nancy exclusion for normal pregnancies remained a live issue for a fourth plaintiff, Jac-
queline Jaramillo.
7. CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2901 (West 1972). Participation in the
program is mandatory unless the employee contibutes to one of the approved pri-
vate plans. Id. § 3254. In January 1971, 7% of the employees utilized private plans.
See R. MILLIMAN & J. ROBERTSON, ACTUARIAL REPORT OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION DISABILITY FUND: 1970, at 21 (1971).
8. CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE §§ 984, 985, 2901 (West 1972). Section 985,
as amended, raises the maximum annual contribution to $90 for the 1974 calendar year.
CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 985 (West Supp. 1974).
9. Id. § 2652.
10. Id. § 2655.
11. Id. § 2627(b).
1975]
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Disabilities lasting beyond twenty-six weeks are not covered, nor are bene-
fits awarded in excess of one-half of an employee's base period earnings.
12
The range of illnesses and injuries for which the risk of disability is cov-
ered is extensive and includes, for example, disabilities resulting from cos-
metic plastic surgery, voluntary sterilization, obesity, sex change operations,
hemophelia, prostatectomies, hernias, sickle cell anemia, heart attacks, re-
moval of wisdom teeth, orthodonture, and hair transplants.' Disabilities re-
sulting from "abnormal and involuntary complications of pregnancy" are also
covered. 14 Aside from disabilities -resulting from normal pregnancy and dis-
abilities lasting less than eight days or more than twenty-six weeks, the only
other disabilities which are excluded from coverage are those resulting from
court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or sexual psychopath.'
The Court's evaluation of the coverage afforded by California's program
led to one of its most critical conclusions, that the system was intended by
the legislature to operate in accordance with standard insurance concepts,' 0
a point disputed at length by the parties in -their briefs.' 7 Actuarial princi-
ples require that premiums be correlated to the insurer's foreseeable ex-
pense and that illnesses which are unusually expensive or frequent be ex-
cluded unless the insured pays a premium commensurate with the risk he rep-
resents. Therefore, in view of the substantial expense to be anticipated in
covering normal pregnancy, the Court's conclusion that California intended
its system to operate in accordance with insurance concepts facilitated its
ultimate decision to uphold the exclusion as rationally supportable.' 8
However, the basis for the Court's conclusion that actuarial considerations
govern California's plan is not clear. The program, unlike many private
12. Id. § 2653.
13. See 359 F. Supp. at 794. See also Appellees' Brief at 4, Geduldig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
14. CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2626.2 (West Supp. 1974).
15. Id. § 2678 (West 1972). However, the Deputy Attorney General of California
took the position before the Court that since court commitment in such cases is "a
fairly archaic practice . . . it would be unrealistic to say that they constitute valid
exclusions." See 417 U.S. at 499 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16. The Disability Fund is wholly supported by the one percent of wages annu-
ally contributed by participating employees .... [I]n recent years between
90% and 103% of the revenue. . . has been paid out in disability and hospital
benefits. This history strongly suggests that the one-percent contribution rate,
in addition to being easily computable, bears a close and substantial relation-
ship to the level of benefits payable and to the disability risks insured under the
program.
417 U.S. at 492-93.
17. Brief for Appellant at 10-14, 30-36, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974);
Brief for Appellee at 6-20, id.; Reply Brief for Appellant at 3-4, id.
18. See 417 U.S. at 492.
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plans, consists of a pooling of all risks by insuring all employees at the same
rate. The flat one per cent contribution rate means -that low risk employees
are actually charged more than actuarial principles require, making the
good risks carry the bad. Moreover, there is no direct proportional relation-
ship between contributions made and benefits received, since employees
with high earnings whose percentage of contributions to the plan are greater
receive benefits only equal to those received by lower paid workers who have
contributed less.19  Nevertheless, it can be argued that all insurance is
based on -the pooling of some risks and the exclusion of others and that,
aside from pregnancy-related disabilities, short term and long term disabili-
ties are also excluded from the pool.
A common actuarial consideration is a group's contributions in relation to
the proportion of benefits it receives, and the statistics which the Court
quoted showing that women already receive a disproportionately high share
of benefits 20 were used to substantiate its holding that there was no dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. However, if the Court had not deter-
mined that California's insurance plan was governed by actuarial princi-
ples, the level of benefits received in relation to contributions made by a par-
ticular group of participants would have been irrelevant.
That a disproportionate share of benefits are received by women may be
explained by the fact that women are lower wage earners than men and that
the program is structured to be of equal benefit to low income and high in-
come workers. 21 The discrepancy between contributions made and benefits
received by women is mitigated further by evidence that age and income are
far more significant factors in predicting the amount of disability benefits
payable than sex, 22 yet there are no exclusions of disabilities correlated with
these factors.
B. The Court's Acceptance of California's Policy Determination
A second key to evaluating Aiello is analysis of the Court's view that the
19. See CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2655 (West 1972).
20. Appellant contends that the fact that women as a class contribute 28% of
program funds and receive 38% of program benefits demonstrates that they
are more costly to insure .... Women receive more than they contribute,
however, not because they have more costly disabilities, but rather because
(1) average wages for women are only 60% of those for men, and (2) Cali-
fornia's statutory scheme ensures that lower paid workers will get paid more
than they contribute for the same disability experience.
Brief for Appellee at 82-83, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (citations omitted).
21. See CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2655 (West 1972).
22. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY'S JOINT COMMITTEE ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION DISABILITY INSURANCE, FINAL REPORT 43 (1966).
19751
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variables of the program-the benefit level, the risks selected to be insured,
and the contribution rate-are policy determinations by the state. The Court
framed the issue of the case as whether the equal protection clause requires
that the state provide benefits to women who have incurred disability in the
course of a normal pregnancy. 2
3
In one sense, the program may be viewed as implementing the state's
broad policy of compensating disabled workers. Other policy determina-
tions were made in order to effectuate this goal, including the decisions to
collect a minimal one per cent contribution from each worker, to provide
protection for workers without drawing on state resources, and the decision
not to establish a maternity benefit program for normal childbirth.,
4
Rather than policy determinations, however, it is arguable that these last
three "policies" are merely the procedures for the administration of the
program, and as such should not be elevated to the status of a legislative pol-
icy to which the Court must defer.25  This was essentially the position of the
district court; the legislative purpose of the disability insurance plan is solely
to alleviate the economic hardship of those unable to work, a hardship
which is the same for pregnant women as it is for other disabled workers. 26
From this perspective, the fiscal integrity of the plan may be viewed not as a
goal, but as a means to achieve a goal.
From the Supreme Court's perspective, however, the legislative purpose is
more specific and encompasses not only the desire to alleviate economic
hardship but to regulate the manner in which this is done by providing the
broadest possible coverage at a rate affordable even by the lowest paid
worker.2 T The Court found support for its decision to defer to the judgment
cf the state legislature from its earlier rulings in Dandridge v. Williams,28
Jefferson v. Hackney,29 and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.
30
23. "The essential issue . . . is whether the Equal Protection Clause requires such
policies to be sacrificed or compromised in order to finance the payment of benefits to
those whose disability is attributable to normal pregnancy and delivery." 417 U.S. at
494.
24. See Brief for Appellant at 15, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
25. See Brief for Appellee at 56, id.
26. Applying the standard of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), discussed at pp. 272-
73 infra, the district court stated that the decision "whether the exclusion of pregnancy-
related disabilities from the program is arbitrary or rational depends upon whether preg-
nancy and pregnancy-related illness substantially differ from the included disabilities in
some manner relevant to the puiposes of the disability insurance program." Aiello v.
Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
27. 417 U.S. at 493.
28. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
29. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
30. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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Dandridge and Jefferson involved the constitutionality of public welfare
assistance programs, known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), as administered by the states of Maryland and Texas. In Mary-
land, discrimination against large families was alleged because an upper
limit had been placed on the amount of money any one family could receive
under the program. In Texas, a percentage reduction factor had been ap-
plied to the amount which had been determined necessary for each cate-
gory of assistance. Percentage reduction factors of 100%, 95%, and 75%
were applied to programs designed to assist the e!derly, the disabled, and
for AFDC, respectively. Racial discrimination was alleged because the
proportion of Mexican Americans and blacks in the AFDC program was
higher than in the other Texas public welfare assistance programs.
Both cases were preceded by Williamson, in which the Court rejected
due process and equal protection attacks on a statute which prohibited fitting
lenses without a physician's prescription, but which excepted ready-to-wear
eyeglass concerns from it prohibition. The Court upheld this classification,
finding that a legislature may address itself to those phases of a problem
which it sees as most acute, while neglecting others, without falling within the
fourteenth amendment's proscription of invidious discrimination.
Although -the classification in Williamson had no relation to an identifiable
class against which there had been frequent discrimination, the reasoning
of the case was incorporated and expanded in Dandridge and Jefferson.
The standard applied was the same: the legislative scheme need not be com-
prehensive but only rationally based to be found free from invidious discrimi-
nation. 3'
The recognition of the states' broad discretion in administering their social
welfare programs mark the Jefferson, Dandridge and Aiello decisions as part
of a continuing attempt by the Court to protect the states from a flood of
31. See also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (denial of education bene-
fits under the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(21), 1652
(a)(1), 1661(a) (1970), to a conscientious objector who satisfactorily finished two
years of alternative service does not violate equal protection as arbitrary classification);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (state's denial of equal workmen's
compensation recovery rights to dependent, unacknowledged illegitimate children vio-
lated equal protection clause when statutory classification bore no rational relationship
to any legitimate state interest); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (section
224 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1970), providing for reduction of ben-
efits to anyone also receiving workmen's compensation, does not make an arbitrary un-
constitutional distinction between disabled employees who receive workmen's compensa-
tion and those getting compensation from private insurance or tort claim awards); James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (article 34 of the California constitution providing
that no low-income housing be developed until approved by majority vote of locality in
referendum does not violate equal protection clause).
1975]
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lawsuits on grounds that their programs disproportionately benefit one group
of citizens, or from liability for a commitment of welfare funds in excess of
that allocated by their legislature. In holding that the asserted under-inclu-
siveness of the set of risks California selected to insure did not violate the
equal protection clause, the Court in Aiello anticipated that if disability pay-
ments for normal pregnancy were required, payments for long and short term
disabilities, also excluded, could be compelled.3 2
The extreme complexity involved in constructing a social program which
balances conflicting demands is one further factor in favor of giving state
statutory schemes considerable deference. These concerns were expressed
by ,the Court in Dandridge:
We do not decide today 'that the [state law] is wise, that it
best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that
[the state] might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane
system could not be devised. Conflicting claims of morality and
intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every
measure . . . . But the intractable economic, social, and even
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance pro-
grams are not the business of this Court . . . [T]he Constitution
does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged
with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare
funds among the myriad of potential recipients.83
The Court's concerns, if not its conclusions, in Jefferson and Dandridge
may be justified. The application of these holdings to the California leg-
islative scheme, however, raises questions not presented by those cases be-
cause the exclusion at issue in the California program applies solely to women,
and, as a sex classification, may require a different standard of review. In
Dandridge the classification was based on family size, and in Jefferson each
category of assistance had substantial numbers of interracial members,3 4 so
32. 417 U.S. at 495.
33. 397 U.S. at 487. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973). In upholding Texas' statutory scheme for financing public education
through the use of an ad valorem tax by each school district to supplement state funds,
which resulted in substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures due to the differences
in amounts received through local property taxation, the Rodriguez Court, in part, justi-
fied its refusal to strictly scrutinize the challenged procedure by stating:
Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local
problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the rais-
ing and disposition of public revenues .... In such a complex arena in which
no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous
a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 41 (footnote omitted).
34. 406 US. at 548.
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that there was no one category containing only members of the class subject
to the alleged discrimination. A further basis for questioning the applica-
tion of these holdings to Aiello is that, unlike the programs at issue in Mary-
land and Texas, the California disability insurance system is not financed
from the public treasury but exclusively from contributions of the em-
ployees who enjoy its benefits. In view of the expressed goals of the pro-
gram, the exclusion of a class of needy contributors under a claim of blan-
ket discretion to remedy problems "one step at a time"85 is not nearly so ra-
tional.
II. PREVIOUS JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO ASSERTIONS
OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS
The evolution of the consciousness of the courts, and particularly the Su-
preme Court, in the area of women's rights has been remarkably slow in
view of the activist role it has played in striking down discriminatory prac-
tices aimed at other highly "visible" groups, especially those which were
identifiable on the basis of race.30 A partial explanation may be that
women have not been residentially segregated, and the socio-economic prob-
lems which they endure as a group are unique. Further, although they form
a majority of -the population,37 they cannot point to as clear a fourteenth
amendment mandate to end discrimination as may those who have been the
target of racial discrimination.
3 8
The traditional approach of the courts has been to place woman in a class
by herself, purportedly in the interest of her protection.3 9 Her position has
35. Id. at 546.
36. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 US. 369 (1967) (article in state constitution,
prohibiting state from denying right of any person to sell his real property to whomever
he chooses, involves state in private racial discrimination to unconstitutional degree);
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (municipality barred from acting as trustee un-
der private will that fosters racial segregation); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948) (state cannot restrict alien's ability to earn living); Shelley v. Krae-
mer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenant held un-
constitutional).
37. See THE WORLD ALMANAC 132 (1973 ed.).
38. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The ERA: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). The authors advocate enactment
of the Equal Rights Amendment, for "without a constitutional mandate, women's status
will never be accorded the special concern which race now receives because of the his-
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 885.
39. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (affirming second degree murder
conviction of woman tried by all-male jury under statute providing, in substance, that
no woman shall be taken for jury duty unless she volunteers for it). Contra, Taylor v.
Louisiana, 43 U.S.L.W. 4167 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1975); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948) (state statute which, in effect, forbids any female to be a bartender unless she
1975]
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been viewed, not as disadvantaged, but as the natural and desirable result of
the effort to spare her the base concerns of the everyday business world:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the fe-
male sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life . . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to
fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. 4°
It is only in the most recent -times that such sentiments have been more
commonly characterized as romantic paternalism.
41
The first significant breakthrough in the Supreme Court's analysis of sex
discrimination was Reed v. Reed,42 where the Court invalidated an Idaho
statute which gave mandatory preference to male applicants over equally
qualified female applicants for appointment as administrators of decedents'
estates. Articulating what has since become a commonly quoted equal
protection standard, the Court stated that, whi'e different classes of people
may be treated differently, a classification
must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
is wife or daughter of male owner does not violate equal p:otection); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (state statute providing minimum wages for women
upheld); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (state can prohibit women from
working in restaurants in large cities between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 am.); M ller v.
Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (upholding state slatute prohibiting employment of
women in certain industries, e.g., hotels); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914)
(state can limit hours worked by women in factories); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall,
223 U.S. 59 (1912) (upholding statute imposing license fee on haid laundries but
exempting those employing two or less womei); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
(state statute forbidding females from working in certain establishments more than ten
hours a day upheld, at least with respect to laundries); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872) (upholding state's refusal to grant license to practice law to a wo-
man). See also Comment, Sexual Mythology and Employment Discrimination, 3 SETON
HALL L. Rv. 108 (1971).
40. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).
41. See, e.g., SaiI'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1971) (statute prohibiting women from tending bar unless they are liquor licensees,
wives of licensees or, individually or with their hustands sole shareholders of corporate
licensee, violates equal protection). The court stated:
The desire to protect women from the general hazards inherent in many occu-
pations cannot be a valid grouad for excluding them f om [certain hazardous
occupations]. . . . Women must be permitted to take their claices alo-g with
men when they are otherwise qualified and capable of meeting the require-
ments of their employment. . . . We can no more justify den'al of the
means of earning a livelihood on such a basis than we could deny all women
drivers' licenses to protect them from the risk of inury by drunk drivers.
Id. at 9-10, 485 P.2d at 534, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 334. See Fiontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); cf. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
42. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shal
be treated alike.
43
Since Reed, this standard of review has been utilized to invalidate various
sex-related discriminatory practices. For example, in Green v. Waterford
Board of Education4 4 and Heath v. Westerville Board of Education,45 the
courts relied on Reed to hold school board practices requiring mandatory
resignations or unpaid leaves of absence for pregnant teachers without regard
to the individual teacher's ability to continue working violative of the equal
protection clause. In Heath, the court held that pregnancy could not be dis-
tinguished from other medical disabilities. 46
The district court in Aiello used the Reed standard to invalidate Cali-
fornia's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities. The court adopted the
view that Reed requires a somewhat more rigorous analysis -than the ra-
tional basis test, the traditional mechanism for equal protection review.47
This theory, which has gained considerable acceptance, 48 was conceived by
43. Id. at 76, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
44. 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
46. After pointing out that the defendant had failed to distinguish pregnancy from
other temporary debilitating conditions, the court quoted from the district court's opinion
in Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1154, 1161 (E.D. Va. 1971),
in holding that "[b]ecaus- pregnancy, though unique to women, is like other medical
conditions, the failure to treat it as such amounts to discrimination which is without ra-
tional basis .... ." 345 F. Supp. at 506.
Other sex discrimination cases using Reed as the standard of review include: Lamb
v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972) (state statute allowing females under eighteen
years of age benefits of juvenile court proceedings, while limiting same benefits to males
under sixteen years of age, violates equal protection clause); Scott v. Opelika City
Schools, 63 F.R.D. 144 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (treatment of maternity disabilities differently
from other grounds for sick leave constitutes denial of equal protection and violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 374 F. Supp.
1056 (D. Ore. 1974) (school board procedures under which teacher was refused permis-
sion to apply accumulated sick leave to incapacity caused by childbirth violates equal
protection clause); Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973), prob. juris.
noted, 415 U.S. 911 (1974) (state constitutional provision and statute exempting women
from jury service unless written declaration filed denies equal protection); Bravo v.
Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (pregnant teacher granted prelimi-
nary injunction against school board's maternity leave policies); Williams v. San Fran-
cisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (plaintiff granted prelim-
inary injunction against school district's mandatory leave policy).
47. According to the court, Reed requires "rejection of statutory classifications based
upon stereotypical generalizations rather than reason." 359 F. Supp. at 797.
48. Justice Brennan reiterated this view in his Aiello dissent, where he warned that
"[tihe Court's decision threatens to return men and women to a time when 'traditional'
equal protection analysis sustained legislative classifications that treated differently
members of a particular sex solely because of their sex." 417 U.S. at 503 (citations
omitted). See also Green v. Waterford Board of Education, 473 F.2d 629, 632-33 (2d
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Professor Gerald Gunther, who saw Reed as the Burger Court's attempt "to
blur the distinctions between strict and minimal scrutiny precedents by for-
mulating an overarching inquiry applicable to all." 49 In deciding Reed as it
did, the Court provided an intermediate equal protection analysis for sex-
based legislative classifications. The validity of Gunther's theory is not yet
proven. The recent case of Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,50
which dealt with the constitutionality of mandatory maternity leave rules for
public school teachers, was not decided under this intermediate equal protec-
tion analysis, but rather on due process grounds. 51
The Reed standard was utilized in Scott v. Opelika City Schools,52 de-
cided about one month prior to A iello, to uphold an equal protection
challenge to a plan which distinguished maternity disabilities from other con-
ditions requiring sick leave. Relying on several lower court cases,53 in-
cluding the district court opinion in Aiello, the court in Scott said that there
was no justification for the defendant employer's treatment of maternity dis-
abilities, since "[t]his Court . . . is unable to find that pregnancy in at least
its final stages is not a 'disability.' ,,11 The court rejected financial consider-
ations as a justification by suggesting that similar savings could be made by
denying use of sick leave for other disabilities, especially those of long dura-
tion.55
In contrast to the Scott decision, the Supreme Court in Aiello did not ap-
ply the Reed analysis, and it ultimately upheld the classification at issue.
Two conclusions made by the Court seem to underlie this ultimate
holding: 1) its determination as to the object of California's disability insur-
ance program, and 2) its determination as to whether persons disabled by
normal pregnancy are similarly circumstanced with persons disabled by other
illnesses and injuries.
The object of California's program, as expressed in the statute, is to re-
Cir. 1973); Annual Survey of Labor Law, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1105, 1221
(1974).
49. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 17 (1972).
50. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
51. However, Justice Powell's concurring opinion is consistent with Gunther's theory.
52. 63 F.R.D. 144, 147 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
53. Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973); Gilbert v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372
F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Paar, 6
E.P.D. % 8789 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
54. 63 F.R.D. at 148 n.8.
55. Id. at 147 n.6.
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lieve the economic hardship of unemployment caused by disability.) 6  The
Supreme Court, on the other hand, viewed the statute as having the multi-
faceted purpose of maintaining a self-supporting program functioning essen-
tially in accordance with insurance concepts and providing the broadest pos-
sible disability protection affordable by all employees. 57 It is this more de-
tailed view of the purpose of the program which was the basis for the
Court's conclusion that California's choice of benefit level, risks to be insured
against, and contribution rate bore a close and substantial relationship to the
legislative goals and, as such, were policy determinations to which the
Court must defer as long as "the line drawn by the State is rationally sup-
portable."58
If, on the other hand, the extent of the coverage and the rate of individual
contributions were viewed as merely the mechanics for accomplishing the
program's primary purpose of aiding those unable to work, then the deter-
mination -that the risk excluded had a fair and substantial relation to the ob-
ject of the program would be questionable.
In view of its determination that California's legislative scheme was ra-
tional, the Supreme Court considered the issue 'of whether those disabled by
pregnancy were similarly situated to those disabled for other reasons only per-
functorily, saying, "It]here is no risk from which men are protected and
women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected
and men are not."5 9  Thus the Court concluded that no discrimination on
the basis of gender as such is involved, and that, therefore, Reed was inappli-
cable. 60 Justice Brennan, however, in his dissenting opinion, found preg-
nancy-related disabilities to be functionally indistinguishable from disabilities
arising from other sources, in that they require medical care and usually hos-
pitalization, may involve risk to health and life, and result in economic hard-
ship due to medical expenses and lost wages. 6 '
Implicit in the majority's reasoning is the belief that women are not disad-
vantaged vis-A-vis men since their situations are incomparable, that the ex-
56. See note 4 supra.
57. 417 U.S. at 493.
58. Id. at 495.
59. Id. at 496-97.
60. The Court found that, notwithstanding the fact that only women become preg-
nant,
[a]bsent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts de-
signed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or
the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy
from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as
with respect to any other physical condition.
Id. at 496-97 n.20.
61. Id. at 500, 501. Contra, Newmon v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) (pregnancy is neither a sickness nor a disability).
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clusion is based on an actual physical difference between the sexes and not
on stereotypes or presumptions. This reasoning is symptomatic of the sub-
stantial amount of confusion over whether legislation may reflect the physical
differences between the sexes and still be constitutional.
It is possible that even the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment
2
will not resolve the question. The prospective amendment provides:
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of sex." The amendment's legisla-
tive history indicates, however, that at least some legislators feel that some
classifications on the basis of sex will be permissible. 63 Such classifications
might be made, for example, in statutes providing separate treatment of
men and women when required by such compelling social interests as pri-
vacy, or in statutes whose subject matter relies upon the objective physical
differences between the sexes. 64 Nevertheless, this is not to say that legisla-
tion applicable to both sexes which eliminates one sex from its benefits or
burdens is within the spirit of the amendment.
At the heart of the issue whether those disabled by pregnancy are similarly
situated as those otherwise disabled were the questions of whether pregnancy
is an "illness," 65 whether it is voluntary, and of the reliability of conflicting
data on the duration, frequency and cost of covering normal pregnancy as
compared with other disability risks. Much of the debate involved the mar-
62. H.R.J. Res. 208, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The resolution passed the
House in 1971 and passed the Senate and was cleared for ratification in 1972. As
of October 8, 1974, the National Archives and Records Office of the General Services
Administration had received thirty-three official confirmations from states which had
ratified the amendment.
63. This was indicated by Rep. Martha Griff'ths (D-M'ch.) when she moved to dis-
charge the ERA from further consideration by the Judiciary Committee. See 116 CONG.
REC. 27999, 28005 (1970). It was also recognized by other supporters of the Amend-
ment, including Rep. Florence Dwyer (R-N.J.) and Rep. Donald Fraser (D-Minn.).
See 116 CONG. REC. 28004, 28018 (1970). See Brown, supia note 38, for an ex-
tensive discussion of the ERA.
64. As was pointed out by Rep. Griffiths, one example of the type of law inapplica-
ble to one sex because of objective physical differences are laws dealing with rape. See
116 CONG. REC. 28005 (1970).
65. Appellants distinguished normal pregnancy from covered disabilities by finding
pregnancy to be a normal biological function necessary for the survival of the species
as opposed to illness which exists because the body has failed to function properly. Brief
for Appellant at 18, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Appellees argued that
the injuries occurring to a woman's body during normal childbirth are similar to those
now covered, stressing physical trauma and open wounds. While pregnancy may be nor-
mal from a statistical point of view, the physiological condition which it produces is ab-
normal to the body. See Brief for Appellee at 58, 60, 65, 71, id.
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shalling of statistics, expert testimony, and semantical wrangling, which may
in part explain the Court's failure to discuss the issue in detail.
Although pregnancy is often the result of choice and is subject to planning
in many cases, California's coverage of disabilities resulting from voluntary
procedures such as plastic surgery, hair transplants and orthodonture signifi-
cantly diminishes the argument that only unpredictable illnesses or disabili-
ties are contemplated under California's plan. Moreover, a practical evalu-
ation of the type of disabilities which are predictable in a labor force which
is 34.2% female66 reveals that pregnancy is clearly an inevitable event
among a great percentage of women.
Because pregnancy is a natural, expectable, and societally neces-
sary condition . . . [there is] no merit in . . . [the] argument
:that it may be excluded from equality of treatment in conditions
and benefits of employment because it is a voluntary condition.
Whether voluntary or not, it occurs with certainty and regularity.
6 7
Thus, if women are to assume an equal position in the labor force, the
fact that they inevitably and by nature, albeit "voluntarily," incur certain tem-
porary disabilities may not reasonably be said to justify the denial of the in-
cidents of their equal position, among which are the benefits which usually
accompany disability.
If the Reed standard is to be applied in the future to cases involving classi-
fications based on pregnancy, the issue to be resolved in each case must be
"not whether pregnancy is, in the abstract, sui generis, but whether the le-
gal treatment of pregnancy in various contexts is justified or invidious." 68 In
Aiello the answer depended upon whether the legislative purpose was to pro-
vide disability insurance for those unable to work or was to provide the
specific disability insurance program which was in fact created. It also de-
pended on whether, in the context of the legislative purpose, there was suf-
ficient difference between the included and the excluded disabilities to jus-
tify the conclusion that they were not similar situations.
A. Is Pregnancy a Sex-Based Classification?
The Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion of pregnancy in the Cali-
fornia statute was not a classification based on gender as such because in its
view not every legislative classification involving pregnancy is sex-based.6 9
This view is similar to that expressed by a Florida federal district court in
66. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 41 (1972).
67. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1158 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
68. Brief for Appellee at 38. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
69. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. See note 60 supra.
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Raford v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc.,70 in which it held that the
discharge of men because of their moustaches and beards did not constitute
sex discrimination. The court said that
[t]he discharge of pregnant women or bearded men does not violate
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 simply because only women become
pregnant and only men grow beards. In neither instance are similar-
ly situated persons of the opposite sex favored. These cases are per-
haps more properly considered under the rubric . . . that discrimi-
nation between different categories of the same sex is not unlawful
discrimination by sex. This is a case of discrimination in favor
of men who shave .... 71
The analogy between pregnancy and wearing a beard is suspect. The de-
cision not to shave facial hair is neither an inevitable and necessary occur-
rence among a certain percentage of our population, nor has there been rec-
ognized a fundamental right to wear a beard. While it may be constitutional
to discriminate between different categories of the same sex with respect to
some characteristics, to discriminate on the basis of a trait unique to one sex
is inevitably to classify on the basis of sex.
The basis for the Supreme Court's distinction in Aiello between a sex-
based classification and a classification based on a characteristic unique to
one sex is a view similar to that of the Rafford court. The Court attempted
to distinguish the Aiello facts from Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richard-
son72 on the grounds that in the latter the discrimination was based on "gen-
der as such," while in the California legislation, benefits accrue to members
of both sexes since the program divides potential recipients into two groups
-pregnant women and non-pregnant persons.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender
as such . . . becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The
program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is ex-
clusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The
fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to mem-
bers of both sexes. 78
The Court's conclusion in Aiello that the exclusion was not based on gender
as such was supported by statistics showing the aggregate risk protection of
the program and indicating that both the annual claim rate and the annual
claim cost are greater for women than for men: women receive 38% of -the
70. 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
71. Id. at 320.
72. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See pp. 280-81 injra.
73. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20. See note 60 supra.
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benefits and contribute about 28% of the fund.74
The Court's analysis can be challenged, however, since, due to -the nature
of pregnancy, a woman obviously cannot be pregnant at all times, and thus
may be within the class of pregnant women at one time and the class of
non-pregnant persons at another. This conclusion had been rejected by the
spate of lower court cases which concluded that regulations pertaining to
pregnancy are sex classifications. 75 Statistical realities also detract from this
view: 84% of all married women become pregnant at least once, 76 and "[n]o-
body-and this includes Judges, Solomonic or life-tenured-has yet seen a
male mother. '77 In the California statute in question, only women are ex-
cluded from benefits because no man has ever experienced the ill-favored,
gender-linked condition of pregnancy, and no disability risk to which men
only are characteristically subjected is excluded from coverage.
The fact that women as a group benefit from a scheme and that not all
women are excluded does not mean that the classification is not based on
sex. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta ,Corp.,78 for example, -the fact that the
employer, in refusing to consider female applicants with pre-school age chil-
dren, was choosing from among primarily female applicants which gave a
net effect of non-discrimination did not prevent the Court from finding that
74. See Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See also note
26 supra.
75. Cases striking down regulations pertaining to pregnancy sex classifications in-
clude: Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973) (mandatory
maternity leave invalid); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973)
(mandatory resignation or unpaid leave of absence during pregnancy violates equal pro-
tection clause); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), a!f'd
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Seaman v. Spring Lake Park Indep. School Dist.,
363 F. Supp. 944 (D. Minn. 1973) (injunctive relief granted against mandatory leave
of absence for pregnant teacher); Jordan v. Meskill, IA CCH UNEM'PL. INS. REP.
21,420 (D. Conn. 1973) (denial of unemployment compensation to pregnant women
unconstitutional); Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972)
(mandatory resignation or unpaid leave of absence during pregnancy violates equal pro-
tection clause); Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972) (immediate dis-
charge of pregnant WAF invalid); Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 333 F.
Supp. 1357 (D.. Kan. 1971) (hospital's discharge of pregnant female because unmarried
constitutes sex discrimination); Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist., 450 Pa.
207, 299 A.2d 277 (1973) (school board's termination of pregnant teacher's contract
violates Pennsylvania Human Rights Act); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d
599 (1974) (statute disqualifying pregnant women from receiving unemployment in-
surance invalid).
76. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION
1970, Detailed Characteristics, Summary Table 212, at 41 (1971).
77. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown,
C.J., dissenting) (denial of motion for rehearing en banc), vacated and remanded, 400
U.S. 542 (1971).
78. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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this was a case of classification on the basis of sex.79
B. Sex as a Suspect Class
Because the Court in Aiello determined that the California disability ex-
clusion could not be classified as discrimination based on gender as such, as
in Reed and Frontiero,80 it was unnecessary for it to resolve what is usually
the threshold issue in a sex discrimination case, the standard of review to
be applied to test the validity of the classification.
The Reed analysis, as discussed above,81 offers one approach for evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of a classification based on sex. Other possibilities
have been suggested by Frontiero and Cleveland Board of Education v. La-
Fleur.
82
,In Frontiero the Court invalidated statutory provisions88 providing in-
creased benefits for married male members of the armed services based on a
conclusive presumption of their spouses' dependency, but requiring female
members to prove that their spouses were dependent in fact for more than
one half of their support in order to qualify.
Due to the lack of consensus among the Justices, Frontiero is responsible,
to a large extent, for much of the uncertainty in the evaluation of sex-based
classifications. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Blackmun, and
Justice Stewart in a separate opinion, considered the statute invalid on the
basis of Reed. Justice Stewart said only -that the statute caused invidious
and unconstitutional discrimination,8 4 while the Burger opinion stated that
the decision as to whether sex is a suspect class was unnecessary because of
the pending ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.
8 5
79. Since § 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970),
requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespec-
tive of their sex, the Court concluded that the couit of appeals erred in construing it
as, in fact, allowing one policy of hiring for women and another for men when each
have preschool age children. However, since the court of appeals had affirmed the mo-
tion for summary judgment, 416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969), the Supreme Court re-
manded the case for further evidentiary consideration as to whether the absence of pre-
school children of female employees was a bona fide occupational qualification. 400
U.S. at 544.
80. See note 72 supra.
81. See p. 272 supra.
82. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
83. 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1970); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1970).
84. Justice Stewart, citing Reed, concurred in the majority opinion and stated: "[T]he
statutes . . . work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution." 411
U.S. at 691.
85. Speaking for Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell concluded
that Reed should control and that the instant case should be decided on its authority,
reserving for the future "any expansion of its rationale." Justice Powell indicated that
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The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined in by Jus-
tices Douglas, White, and Marshall, held that sex is a suspect class8 6 and that
the legislative scheme in question could not survive the scrutiny it invited.
In finding that the statute constituted a deprivation of the fifth amendment
guarantee of due process, the Court rejected the administrative conven-
ience argument that it was more economical and simpler to conclusively pre-
sume the dependency of wives in the absence of evidence that the govern-
ment had saved money.
The plurality's ruling that sex is a suspect class has been concurred in by
a growing number of state and lower federal courts including the Washington
Supreme Court in Hanson v. Hutt,8 7 where a statute disqualifying pregnant
women from receiving unemployment insurance was held invalid, and a
Pennsylvania federal district court in Stern v. Massachussetts Indemnity &
Life Insurance Co.,88 which concerned selling insurance to men and women
on equal terms.
The determination that sex is a suspect class would be consistent with the
Supreme Court's repeated recognition of the constitutional rights of classes
which have been saddled with special disabilities, historically subjected to
purposefully unequal treatment, or relegated to a position of political power-
lessness.89 The Court has extended this protection in the past to those classi-
fied as a result of congenital and immutable characteristics, which were ac-
cidents of birth over which the individual had no control, by requiring the
state to demonstrate that the challenged legislation served overriding or com-
pelling interests which could not be achieved by a more narrowly drawn legis-
lative classification or by the use of feasible, less drastic alternatives.9"
use of stricter judicial scrutiny by the Court would constitute preemption of a major po-
litical decision on the ERA. 411 U.S. at 691-92.
86. 411 U.S. at 682.
87. 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1974).
88. 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985
(1970), alleging defendant insurer refused to sell disability insurance to women under
the same terms available to men solely on the basis of sex). See Ballard v. Laid,
360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd sub nora. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95
S. Ct. 572 (1975) (statute guaranteeing active commissioned service to female lieu-
tenant naval officers invalid under due process clause); United States ex rel. Robin-
son v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) (statute providing longer sentences for
adult women guilty of misdemeanors than those imposed on men violated equal protec-
tion clause); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1971). See also note 41 supra.
89. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
90. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 358 (1974). See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964) (race); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (wealth); Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin).
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The strict scrutiny which is required after the determination that a class
is suspect imposes a heavier burden upon the plaintiff than that applied to
other plaintiffs challenging economic and social welfare programs, such as
those of Dandridge and Jefferson. In fact, the district court in Frontiero
relied on Dandridge to find that the rational basis behind the classification
was substantial economic and administrative savings.9 ' However, once the
classification was termed suspect by the Frontiero plurality of the Supreme
Court, more than a showing that the statute rationally promoted legitimate
government interests was required. -It is unlikely that -the fiscal integrity of
a disability insurance program would justify such a differentiation as was
made in the California statute if strict scrutiny were applied,9 2 especially in
view of the variety of alternatives suggested by the district court.
93
Strict scrutiny is required not only where a suspect class is involved, 'but
where -the exercise of a fundamental right is prevented or impaired. 4  Sev-
eral lower courts, for example, have found the right to employment to be
one of the basic civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution."5 In addition, the
right to conceive and bear children has been considered part of the funda-
mental right to privacy in matters of marriage and family life,906 and has been
91. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 206-07 (M.D. Ala. 1972). See also 51 J.
URn. L. 535, 536 (1974).
92. "The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification."
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
93. The increased costs could be accommodated quite easily by making rea-
sonable changes in the contribution rate, the maximum benefits allowable, and
the other variables affecting the solvency of the program. For example, the
entire cost increase estimated by defendant could be met by requiring workers
to contribute an additional amount of approximately .364 percent of their sal-
ary and increasing the maximum annual contribution to about $119.
359 F. Supp. at 798.
94. Compare Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), involving
the fundamental right to interstate travel, with United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973), holding that the right to discharge in bankruptcy is not a fundamental right.
Cases which have recognized certain rights as being "fundamental" are: Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (appeal of crimi-
nal conviction).
95. See Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973); Williams
v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Sail'er Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
96. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974) (freedom of
choice in matters of marriage and family life protected by due process clause); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage is a fundamental right); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage and procreation are fundamental rights);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (recognition of "liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control");
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reaffirmed in cases dealing with a state's regulation of contraceptives and
abortion.
97
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, the Supreme Court struck
down mandatory cut-off dates after which pregnant public school teachers
were required to take maternity leave as an unjustifiable legislative impinge-
ment upon a woman's right to decide whether to bear a child, void under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The conclusive presump-
tion of the teacher's physical incapacity in her fifth or sixth month of preg-
nancy was held to be unsound, and it was further held that the ends of ad-
ministrative convenience could not supersede the due process requirement
where the rights of individuals were concerned.
98
The result that the Court sought to avoid in LaFleur, the imposition of a
heavy economic burden on a woman as a consequence of her choice to
exercise a fundamental right, is the same result permitted by Aiello. Implicit
in the California exclusion is the same type of presumption as to the nature
of pregnancy and pregnant women as was prohibited in LaFleur. The only
distinctions which seem to indicate why the results in these cases are different
are that LaFleur was more directly concerned with an individual woman's
decision to become pregnant than was Aiello. Also the correction of the in-
equity in LaFleur did not have the same fiscal consequences as would result
from inclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities in the California disability in-
surance program.
C. The Protective Exception
Another dimension of the confusion surrounding the standard to be ap-
plied by -the courts in reviewing a classification based on sex is illustrated in
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (19,23) (fourteenth amendment's "liberty" de-
notes "freedom . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children"); Buckley v.
Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96 (10th Cir. 1973) (right to bear children is fun-
damental).
97. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (prior to end of first trimester of preg-
nancy, state may not interfere with or regulate doctor's decision reached in consultation
with patient whether pregnancy should be terminated); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (statute making it a crime to sell, lend or give away contraceptives except to
married persons violates equal protection clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (statute making use rather than distribution or manufacture of contraceptives a
criminal offense is unconstitutional invasion of privacy of married persons).
98. The opinion was written by Justice Stewart and joined in by Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justices Douglas and Powell wrote concurring opinions
and Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent. The Court did leave open
the question of the permissibility of mandatory maternity leave at some definite date
close to the expected date of birth. 414 U.S. at 647 n.13. See also Robinson v. Rand,
340 F. Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972).
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Kahn v. Shevin,99 where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Florida statute giving widows a $500 exemption from property taxation but
offering no similar benefit for widowers. Writing for the Court, Justice
Douglas, notwithstanding his Frontiero opinion,10° found that according to
the Reed standard Florida's differing treatment of widows and widowers
should be upheld because it was reasonably designed to further the state pol-
icy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss on the sex for whom
that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden. The Court said that
"[w]hile the widower can usually continue in the same occupation which
preceded his spouse's death in many cases the widow will find herself sud-
denly forced into 'a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which,
because of her former economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to
offer." 101 The dissenting opinions reiterated that sex is a suspect classifica-
tion and, under the strict scrutiny standard, found that the classification
must be more narrowly drawn. The Florida exemption was in no way tied
to the actual need of the widow claiming it, but was founded upon the pre-
sumption that all widows are more needy and less qualified for employ-
ment than their male counterparts.
Similar reasoning provided the basis for the Second Circuit's decision in
Gruenwald v. Gardner,10 2 where the Social Security Act' 0 3 was upheld
against a challenge by a male on the ground that the computation of benefits
was more favorable for women retiring at age sixty-two than for men retiring
at the same age with a history of equal earnings. As in Kahn, the purpose
of the legislation was to "reduce the disparity between the economic and
physical capabilites of a man and a woman."' 01 4 The court found a reason-
able relationship between the object of the classification and the means
employed to achieve it. In sanctioning preferential treatment of women in
certain contexts, Gruenwald and Kahn represent a new alternative to equal
99. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
100. Justice Douglas distinguished Frontiero as a case where the government denied
its female employees substantive and procedural benefits granted males, "solely for ad-
ministrative convenience." Id. at 355, quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
690 (1973).
101. 416 U.S. at 355.
102. 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968). Cf. Kohr v.
Weinberger, 43 U.S.L.W. 2066 (E.D. Pa., July 26, 1974), in which a three judge court
held that the benefits computations under the Social Security Act which permit women
to use fewer years than men to compute average monthly wage, which is the basis of
benefits, thereby eliminating more years of lower earning than men, is not unconstitu-
tional discrimination against men. The court relied on the authority of Kahn and Gru-
enwald.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (1970).
104. 390 F.2d at 592-93.
[Vol. 24:263
Pregnancy Disability Benefits
protection and due process "rational basis" analysis for cases involving protec-
tive legislation.
The question presented by these cases in the context of Aiello is whether
providing benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities, when women already
receive a disproportionate share of benefits in relation to their contributions,
would constitute the same type of preferential protective legislation. The
answer, however, is no, because social programs with narrowly drawn regu-
lations which ultimately aid one group more than another can be distin-
guished from social programs with broad exclusions or exemptions for en-
tire classes.
III. Aiello VIEWED FROM A TITLE VII PERSPECTIVE
Although not discussed by the majority of the Court in Aiello, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972105 and the Sex Discrimination Guidelines promulgated
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,'0 6 the federal agency
charged with enforcement of the Act, are relevant so this case as an expres-
sion of congressional intent and administrative policy regarding the treatment
of women in the area of employment.
Title VII was enacted by Congress as a comprehensive prohibition of pri-
vate acts of employment discrimination, but, as amended in 1972, it now
prohibits most public and private employers from discriminating against an
employee in hiring and firing practices or in the terms or conditions of em-
ployment on the basis of sex except "in those certain instances where ...
sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."''07 The Act,
therefore, was not legally binding in Aiello even if its violation were alleged,
because California is not acting as an employer or an employment agency
in administering its plan.'08
105. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to h-2 (Supp. II, 1972).
106. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-10 (1974).
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(i) (Supp. II, 1972). One example where sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification is in the theatre. Section 703(a), which reveals the
basic thrust of Title VII, reads in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin . ...
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 20C0,-2(a), (b) (1970). On Title VII and the 1972 amend-
ments, see Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972).
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The EEOC, pursuant to its power under the Act to "issue, amend, or re-
scind suitable procedural regulations :to carry out the provisions of Title
VI,' ' 10 9 has published Sex Discrimination Guidelines which prohibit specific
forms of sex discrimination such as sex stereotyping, separate lines of pro-
gression for men and women, discrimination against married women and dis-
crimination in job advertising. These Guidelines explicitly provide that an
employment practice which excludes employees because of pregnancy is a
prima facie violation of Title VII.110 Since one statutory basis for a violation
of Title VII is sex discrimination, the fact that the Guidelines make dis-
crimination because of pregnancy a violation of the Act indicates that the
Commission considers pregnancy a sex classification. The Guidelines further
provide that disabilities caused by pregnancy, miscarriage or abortion are to
be treated as temporary disabilities under any health, insurance or sick
leave plan available in connection with employment."'
Although Title VII was not legally binding on the Court in Aiello, nor
even considered by the majority, the case should be viewed in light of the
fact that one of the Commission's major roles is that of safeguarding the
rights of working women. The Commission's view is that a pregnancy exclu-
sion similar to the one at issue in Aiello, if contained in a private or public
employee disability plan, would violate Title V,11. In its amicus brief the
Commission recommended that 'the Court apply standards similar to Com-
mission Guidelines in evaluating California's program. 1 2
The typical pattern in Title VII sex discrimination cases involves some
form of sex stereotyping prohibited under the Guidelines. 113  A classic exam-
ple is the case of Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,114 in
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1970).
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1974).
111. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1974) provides:
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abor-
tion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, tem-
porary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance plan available in connection with employment. Written
and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as the
commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual
of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment un-
der any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or
informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the
same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
112. Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 8, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1974). See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Diaz v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971);
Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1972).
114. 408 F.2d 228 (Sth Cir. 1969).
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which a well-tenured female employee's application for a higher position was
rejected solely because of her sex. The Fifth Circuit held that in this case
sex did not fall within the narrow bona fide occupational qualification ex-
ception, since there was no evidence that all or substantially all women
would be unable to perform the heavy lifting or respond to the occasional
late night calls which were part of the job. Rejecting the stereotyped con-
ception of woman's weakness and her need to be sheltered as outmoded,
the court held that, henceforth, an individual determination of each woman's
capabilities was required. 115  Another case dealing with the traditional
stereotype of women is Burns v. Rohr Corp.,' 6 where a state regulation re-
quiring rest periods for women was invalidated. An employer's refusal to
hire women with preschool age children while hiring men who were heads of
households which included preschool age children was also invalidated under
Title VII as based on a stereotyped distinction between the sexes in Phillips
v. Martin-Marietta Corp."1
7
A more recent trend in Title VII litigation has been to challenge prac-
tices which distinguish between men and women in the conditions of their
employment, including sick leave and disability benefits."18  Three such re-
cent cases involved maternity leave, sick leave, and unemployment compen-
sation. In Vick v. Texas Employment Commission, 19 the disqualification
by a state employment agency of a pregnant applicant for unemployment
benefits on the ground that her condition did not permit her to hold a job was
held void under Title VII. The thrust of the decision was that a woman's
individual medical employment record must be considered; "such a natural
and necessary female condition cannot be a basis for categorical discrimina-
tion in light of Phillips and its plain interpretation of Title VII.1'
' 2 0
In Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School District,'2 ' a school district's rule
115. See also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
116. 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
117. 416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
118. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a)(6) (1974). One such series of cases involves pen-
sion plans in which women are given the benefit of earlier retirement ages or the op-
portunity to withdraw a substantial amount of their accrued benefits at an earlier age
upon optional retirement. Several plans have been invalidated under the guideline prohib-
iting unequal pension or retirement plans for men and women. See Rosen v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc.,
444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). Urgansky v. Flynn Em-
rich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957 (D. Md. 1973), involves a Title VII challenge brought by
men.
119. 6 E.P.D. T 8933 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
120. Id. at 5992.
121. 374 F. Supp. 1056, 1061 (D. Ore. 1974). The court did not consider whether
sex is a suspect class, but rather utilized the Reed test.
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that a teacher may not use her accumulated sick leave for absence caused
by childbirth was held to be both an unfair labor practice under Title VII
and contrary to the equal protection clause. In Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., 122 the court denied a motion to reconsider a finding that the
exclusion of pregnancy from the list of disabilities covered by a disability in-
come plan was sex discrimination.
The practices prohibited in these cases are ultimately based on sex stereo-
types more subtle than those underlying weight limitations or required rest
periods. Implicit in the denial of equal conditions of employment to woman
disabled by pregnancy are notions that women leave their jobs for extended
periods when they have children because they are not as interested in their
jobs as are men and because their income is only supplementary to that of
their husbands. These are the same stereotypical views of women that are
implicit in California's exclusion, and which were implicitly endorsed in
A iello.
Because the program established by California is analogous to practices
which have been prohibited under Title VII, and because of the potential
impact of the Aiello decision on the Sex Discrimination Guidelines issued
from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, 123 numerous amici curiae
briefs were submitted 124 by comoanies and associations anxious to ascertain
the status of similar employer-sponsored programs. At present, the status of
similar disability insurance programs which are within the reach of Title VII
may be largely dependent on whether continued deference is paid to the
EEOC's pregnancy-disability Guideline. 125
In determining the weight to be accorded an administrative guideline,
among the factors generally considered are whether the guideline is consist-
ent with congressional intent,' 2 6 whether it is reasonable and thoughtful,' 2
122. 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
123. 28 Fed. Reg. 35336-38 (1963).
124. Briefs supporting appellants were filed by the General Electric Co., American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., National Association of Manufacturers, United States
Chamber of Commerce, Merchants and Manufacturers Association, and the Pacific Le-
gal Foundation. Briefs supporting the appellees were filed by the EEOC, International
Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, the AFL-CIO, American Civil Liberties
Union, Center for Constitutional Rights, NOW, Women's Equity Action League Ed-
ucational & Legal Defense Fund, Human Rights for Women, Inc., and the Physi-
cians Forum.
125. See note 111 supra.
126. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16-23 (1965).
127. Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (ruling, interpretations, and
opinions of Administration under Fair Labor Standards Act constitutes body of experi-
ence to which court properly looked for guidance).
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whether the agency has demonstrated expertise with the subject matter,
whether the interpretation is contemporaneous with the passage of the stat-
ute, and whether the interpretation is one consistently held by the agency.1 ,
The EEOC's position, as expressed in the pregnancy disability Guideline ini
question, was announced in 1972, several years after Title VII became ef-
fective. It is a clear departure from the prior published position of the
EEOC as expressed in a series of opinion letters of tle EEOC's General
Counsel in 1,66. Whether it is consistent with Congressional intent is far
from clear. The Equal Rights Amendment 129 and the Equal Pay Act of
1963130 are possibly accurate reflections of congressional intent in this area.
That intent, however, is in contrast with several other congressional enact-
ments, particularly those dealing with military matters, which authorize dif-
ferent treatment for men and women.' 31
128. Cf. NLRB v. Boei-g Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973) (Court colsidered NLRB's long-
standing administrative construction that it should not inquire into reasonableness of
union penalties imposed upon members); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 18 (1969) (Court
upheld injunction against farm location differential provided by order of the Secretary
of Agriculture as contrary to Agricultural Marketing Ag.eem-nt Act of 1937).
129. See no:e 62 supra.
130. 29 U.S C. § 206(d)(1) (1970), which r-ads in part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate within any establislment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees
of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the perform-
ance of whch requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made
pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit syst~m; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of productioni; or (iv) a differential
based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who
is paying a wage rate differential in violation cf this su'sect'on shall not, in
order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate
of any employee.
131. For an exhaustive listing of such enactments, see Brief for General Elcct-ic Co.
as Amicus Curiae at 46-47, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). A few examples
of such statutes are 14 U.S.C. § 762 (1970) (husband of member of Coast Guard
Women's Reserve not a dependent unless in fact dependent on her for support); 37
U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (a person is not a dependent of a female member of th- military
unless in fact dependent on her for over one-half of his sunport); 38 U.S.C. § 315
(1970) (addt.onal compensation for "wife" of disabled veteran); 41 U.S.C. § 35(d)
(1970) (different minimum employment ages for males and females under government
contracts).
The lack of legislative history to aid in interpretation of § 703(a) of Title VI's pro-
scription against sex discrimination has been noted by the courts. See Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971). No mention of sex is made in the, House report regarding the purpose of
Title VII. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964). See also Annual Sur-
vey of Labor Law, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1105, 1219 (1974).
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The leading case involving the judicial weight accorded to an EEOC
guideline is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,'3 2 in which the Supreme Court ac-
cepted the agency's ruling permitting only job-related tests -to be used in hir-
ing, after a review of the legislative history convinced the Court that the deci-
sions or interpretations of agencies entrusted with enforcement of a federal
statute are entitled to great deference.' 33
More recently, however, in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,'3 4 the
Supreme Court found that the practice of refusing to hire aliens was not
discrimination on the basis of national origin despite a guideline 3 5 making
discrimination on the basis of citizenship equivalent to discrimination on the
basis of national origin. The Court found no need to defer to an ,administra-
tive construction when there Were "compelling indications that it is wrong. '"136
The majority found that the guideline was inconsistent with a prior Commis-
sion position, that its application would be inconsistent with congressional
understanding of the term "national origin" expressed in other legislative
enactments, and inconsistent with general understanding of the term.
The guideline prohibiting discriminatory treatment of pregnancy-related
disabilities is not clearly contrary to congressional intent. Merely because it
differs from the position originally taken by the Commission does not de-
tract from the weight to be accorded the EEOC guideline in question; such
development is explained largely by the nature of our society's developing
understanding of and sensitivity to the sources of discrimination:
Guidelines evolved as perceptions of what constituted employment
discrimination altered . . . . Both the Congress and the Courts
have recognized this to be the case. The Commission carefully
scrutinized both employer practices and their crucial impact on
women . . . and . . . it became increasingly apparent that sys-
132. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
133. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement
responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting § 703(h) [a section of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 pertaining to the use of professionally developed abil-
ity tests utilized by the employer] to permit only the use of job-related tests.
The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled
to great deference. Since the Act and its legislative history support the Com-
mission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as ex-
pressing the will of Congress.
401 U.S. at 433-34 (citations omitted).
134. 411 U.S. 86 (1973).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(d) (1973) reads in relevant part:
Because discrimination on the basis of citizenship has the effect of discriminat-
ing on the basis of national origin, a lawfully immigrated alien who is domi-
ciled or residing in this country may not be discriminated against on the basis
of his citizenship . ...
136. 411 U.S. at 194-95.
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tematic and pervasive discrimination against women was frequently
found in employers' denial of employment opportunities and bene-
fits to women on the basis of the childbearing role .... The fact
that the Commission did not issue its Guidelines immediately can-
not abrogate those rights already enforceable under the Act.
13 7
However, even if the pregnancy guideline were to be invalidated in future
litigation, ithe central issue will always be whether the practice in question is
violative of Title VII. This is essentially the reasoning of Judge Mehrige in
Gilbert v. General Electric Co."38 General Electric provided non-occupa-
tional sickness and accident benefits for employees with the sole exception
of sickness or other disabilities arising from pregnancy, miscarriage or child-
birth. The court accepted the EEOC's construction of the Act as requir-
ing pregnancy to be treated similarly to other temporary disabilities because
it felt this was consistent with the purposes of the Act. "[I]t cannot be rea-
sonably argued -that Congress . . .ever intended an intended beneficiary of
that Act forego a fundamental right, such as a woman's right to bear children,
as a condition precedent to the enjoyment of the benefits of employment
free of discrimination.' u 9
However, the court stated that, regardless of the validity of the Guide-
line, the denial of benefits constituted sex discrimination in violation of the
Act itself because it involved disparate treatment of similarly situated people
"on the basis of a particular condition, the peculiarity of which is both
irrelevant to the purposes of the company program and ineluctably sex
linked.' 40 The court further found that regardless of the possibility that
women might receive more benefits than men if pregnancyrelated disabili-
ties were covered, in view of the plan's purpose to relieve the economic bur-
den of physical incapacity through an all-inclusive disability scheme, the
marginally greater benefits which might inure to women was not preferential
treatment but "recognition of women's biologically more burdensome place
in the scheme of human existence."'1 41  To avoid any increased costs, the
company could simply change the distribution of benefits.
42
In view of the striking similarities in the fact patterns of Aiello and Gilbert,
the question remains how the courts could have reached such disparate re-
sults. One possible explanation may be that the mechanics employed by the
137. Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 10, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974).
138. 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974).
139. Id. at 381-82.
140. Id. at 385.
141. Id. at 383.
142. Under the Guidelines, increased costs is not a defense to a charge of sex dis-
crimination in benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1974).
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private employer whose benefit plan is part of his employees' compensation
deserve less deference than the schema enacted by a state legislature in view
of the difficulties encountered in formulating such programs noted in Dan-
dridge and Jefferson.143 It is also arguable that Congress' purpose in enact-
ing Tit'e VII may have been to create a mechanism better suited for the pro-
teztion of employment rights than is the fourteenth amendment.
Ultimately, the difference in the resolution of these cases results from the
conflicting views adopted by the respective courts as to whether pregnancy
is a sex classification. In view of the Supreme Court's statement in Aiello
that not "every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification,"'1 44 other courts may be wary of characterizing practices in-
volving differing treatment of pregnant women as sex discrimination. The
unresolved question, whether Aiello established that disparate treatment of
pregnancy-related and other disabilities does not constitute sex discrnina-
tion within the prohibition of Title VII or the fourteenth amendment, is the
issue certified to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Communi-
cations Workers of America v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.145
The plaintiffs, who brought suit before the Supreme Court had decided Ai-
ello, alleged a violation of Title VII because their employer's health and hos-
pitalization insurance plans offered fewer benefits for pregnancy and preg-
nancy-related conditions than for other medical problems. 146  Reading Ai-
ello as hokding that disparate treatment based on pregnancy is not in and of
itself sex discrimination, and noting that Title VII deals only with discrimi-
nation which is based on sex classification, 147 the district court concluded that
the Act was clearly inapplicable. 148  The court thus rejected any attempts
to dis'ingu-sh Aiello, as a case involving deference to a state legislature's
policy dezision, from a case involving employer-sponsored programs. For
those courts who seek it, Title VII and its Sex Discrimination Guidelines
provide some support for striking down of such practices. On the other
hand, for those courts which choose to take the opposite position, the ef-
fect of Aiello and Espinoza is to provide a new justification for avoiding the
prohibitions of Title VII.
143. See page 270 supa.
144. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
145. 379 F. Supp. 679, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court dismissed the suit with
leave to replead.
146. Id. at 681.
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1974).
148. 379 F. Supp. at 682. The couit indicated that the claim might be better argued
under the fou;teenth amendment where the plaintiffs could assert that it was irrational to
single out pregnant women regardless cf whether that classification is sex based. Id.
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Practical problems arising from sex discrimination in the conditions
of employment survive the Supreme Court's decision in Aiello. Whether
the solutions will ultimately be judicial, evolving on a case-by-case basis un-
der Title VII and its Sex Discrimination Guide'ines, or legislative, under the
Equal Rights Amendment, there exists a plausible constitutional rationale
upon which a different conclusion may be based.
Virg'nia Voorhees
